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Under the VAT, formal traders report their purchases to the administration for a
deduction in their VAT bill. This paper models this third-party reporting feature of
the VAT in an input-output economy and quantifies it among different activities using
a forward linkages index. The administration can reduce the size of shadow economy
by reallocating visiting audits to backwardly linked activities and cross-checking VAT
payments with input credit claims in forwardly linked activities. Empirical evidence
from Indian service sector justifies the assumptions and suggests a significant increase
in the tax compliance of forwardly linked activities following VAT adoption in 2003.
Keywords: Value-added tax, Informality, Tax enforcement, Linkage analysis
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades, more than 150 countries, including many of the poorest with large
shadow economies,1 has adopted the value-added tax (henceforth VAT). Shadow economy
hinders the efficiency of the VAT (Piggott and Whalley, 2001; Emran and Stiglitz, 2005;
Keen, 2008), but on the other hand the third-party reporting property of the VAT makes
evasion and informality harder (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006; Pomeranz, 2015). Under the
input refund system of the VAT, formal enterprises desire to receive VAT credit on inputs and,
as a result, inform the tax administration about their purchases. This incentive, also labeled
as “self-enforcing” mechanism, provides third-party reported records on sales to formal clients
and helps the administration to find informal suppliers. But, if all clients are informal firms
∗Tilburg University, PO Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands; Sharif University, Tehran, Iran,
M.Hoseini@uvt.nl. I am grateful to Jan Boone and Jenny Ligthart† for their helpful suggestions. I have also
benefited from comments by Thorsten Beck and seminar participants at Tilburg University.
1Up to 2012, 26 low income, 40 lower middle income, 46 upper middle income, and 38 high income
countries implemented the VAT (Keen, 2013). According to Schneider et al. (2011), on average the size of
shadow economy in developing countries is around 40% and ranges up to 70%.
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or final consumers, no record of purchase is reported and the mechanism breaks down. Hence,
the VAT changes in third-party reporting across different activities based on the formality
status of the clients.
To flash the variation in VAT self-enforcement across activities, I present a preliminary
evidence from India.2 The government of India adopted VAT on services in 2003. Figure
1 illustrates tax registration rate among firms in different services versus the share of final
consumption in each activity. The ◦ and × symbols respectively represent the percentage of
enterprises registered for tax in 2001 and 2006. A negative relationship between tax registra-
tion rate and the share of final consumption in an activity is seen only after and not before
VAT adoption. In other words, activities with more sales to businesses rather than households
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Figure 1: Tax registration rate and final consumption in different service sectors of India before and after
VAT adoption in 2003. The ◦ and × symbols represent the registration rates in 2001 and 2006 respectively.
The estimated slope for 2006 is -0.14 with standard deviation 0.059. The registration rate is measured for a
representative sample of “unorganized service sector”. See section 5 for definitions and data details.
Despite the prolonged recognition of the third-party reporting feature of the VAT (e.g.
Tait, 1972, 1991), it has only recently been empirically tested by Pomeranz (2015). She
reports that a random audit letter, in addition to increasing the VAT payment of the treated
firm, also increases tax compliance of the suppliers but not the clients. Yet, the variation
in VAT self-enforcement across activities and an index for measuring it is absent from the
2In section 5, I describe the data and the reform and test this in a more robust fashion.
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literature. This paper tries to tackle two questions in this regard: how does VAT affect tax
evasion across different activities? and how should VAT audit policies be designed across
different activities in an economy characterized by a large informal sector? My approach
to answer these questions is based on exogenous variation in forward and backward linkages
between activities.
Although the role of client’s formality status on VAT evasion is intuitive, determining the
degree of third-party reporting in each activity and gauging the spill-overs on their suppliers
are not straightforward. In reality, the economy is composed of very sophisticated input-
output structures with complex linkages. Some goods are usually sold only to firms or only
to households (e.g. mining activities vs. child caring services), but a wide range of goods
are purchased by both firms and households (financial services, transportation, information
technology, etc.). Moreover, even if the enterprise nature of the customers is known, to
measure VAT self-enforcement, formal and informal business clients must be distinguished.
The position of the activity in the production chain and linkages with other activities are the
main factors to determine the type of clients and the spillovers of the transmission of formality
to the suppliers.
For this reason, I build an input-output model which lays the groundwork for defining
forward and backward linkages. These two sectoral indices respectively reflect the flow of
intermediate products to and from other activities. Next, I add the VAT to this structure
and explain visiting audits and cross-checking invoices – matching each input credit claim
with a corresponding output tax payment – as two distinct enforcement tools in the VAT
system. The theoretical results suggest that in backwardly linked activities, which buy their
inputs from other activities, tax administrators should focus on revealing internal information
of firms by visiting audits. In comparison, in the forwardly linked industries the administra-
tion should concentrate on arm’s-length transactions and cross-checking the invoices with the
corresponding input credit claims.
Using firm-level service sector data from India in 2001 and 2006, the implications of the
model are examined by taking the VAT adoption in 2003 as a natural experiment and com-
paring formality in each activity before and after it. Formality is estimated based on tax
registration rate and share of production by taxpayer firms in each activity. I also compute
forward and backward linkages of each activity using the input-output tables of India in 2003.
The results confirm a positive relationship between activity’s forward linkages and formality
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after VAT adoption. For example, after VAT adoption in 2003, registration rate of storage
and warehousing activities (forward linkages=2.78) increased by 8.97 percentage point more
than of training and coaching (forward linkages=1.01).
The theoretical contribution of this paper is formalizing the self-enforcing feature of the
VAT. For a complex network of activities, the paper provides a reduced-form formula for VAT
enforcement policy by accounting for not only the revenue gains of less evasion in each activity
but also the spill-over gains of the compliance of its suppliers. The paper also fills a gap in the
tax evasion theory by providing a tractable model of intersectoral linkages to study the tax
enforcement problem. Despite the long-established literature on linkage analysis (which dates
back to Rasmussen, 1957), its applications in the economic literature is, for the most part,
neglected by theorists. The empirical contribution of this paper is providing a novel gauge
for each activity to formulate VAT enforcement policy. The great advantage of the linkages
indices is the simple measurability using input-output tables easing policy implementation in
developing countries. Testing the application of the provided indices in India confirms their
validity to quantify the level of formality transmission and formulate the enforcement policy.
In this paper, informality refers to non-registration under tax administration. There are a
number of other frauds in the VAT which are discussed in details in Keen and Smith (2006). In
high-income countries, underground activities comprise relatively smaller share in total VAT
evasion rather than the frauds by registered traders such as misreporting the transactions,
carousel fraud, etc.3 In comparison, shadow economy fraud or failure to register is common
in low-income countries. For instance, in section 5 I find that during 2001-2006 in India, only
17 percent of production in “unorganized service sectors” is produced by tax registered firms.
Hence, the results of this paper is more applicable for developing countries suffering from large
shadow economies.
The findings of the paper contribute to the public finance literature in several ways. A
number of studies in public economics model the VAT from different angles. Some, on a
broader level, compare the efficiency of the VAT to other indirect taxes like tariff and RST
(e.g. Emran and Stiglitz, 2005; Keen, 2008; Boadway and Sato, 2009), while others concentrate
on its optimal design of rates and exemption levels (e.g. Piggott and Whalley, 2001; Keen and
Mintz, 2004). To my knowledge, the only research presenting a theory of VAT evasion is
3As and example, in 2001-02, VAT revenue loss in UK is estimated to be %10.2–%14.2 of total VAT revenue,
among which %0.6–%0.7 is due to non-registration for the VAT (Keen and Smith, 2006). The misreporting
fraud – understating sales and overstating purchases – by registered firms is studied in Hoseini (2014) in
details.
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De Paula and Scheinkman (2010) who address the decision of firms for being formal in a
VAT setting. They consider a two stage production chain with firms heterogeneous in terms
of managerial ability and show that (in)formal firms trade with their (in)formal peers in the
production chain not with the other type. In my model, the same assortative equilibrium can
hold, but I show that an alternative equilibrium with trade between the two sectors is also
possible. The model of De Paula and Scheinkman (2010) is silent about the activity of the
firm and the linkages.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature that studies the role of firms in
facilitating tax enforcement. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) emphasize the importance of inter-
firm information and argue that verifiable paper trails from arm’s-length transactions and
aggregation of information within firms considerably improves tax enforcement. Kleven et al.
(2015), on the other hand, focus on intra-firm information and highlight the role of firms
in facilitating tax enforcement by providing information through third-party reporting of
employees. The VAT is paid by firms and thus enables the tax administration to use both
inter-firm and intra-firm information sources for detecting evasion. To formulate detection
probability, this paper puts together these two instruments and assume one part of detection is
made by checking arm’s-length transactions and the other by third-party reporting of workers.
Finally, this paper contribute to the literature about taxation in developing countries (e.g.
Gordon and Li, 2009; Best et al., 2016). While most part of this literature addresses optimal
taxation in the presence of limited tax capacity, my paper derives a reduced-form formula to
increase tax capacity in a developing country.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2, constructs the basic model and introduces
forward and backward linkages. Next, in section 3, I explain tax administration’s enforcement
instruments in the VAT, and in section 4, I find the market equilibrium and the optimal
enforcement policy in each industry. In the section 5, I empirically examine the existence of
the self-enforcing feature and finally, I conclude.
2 The Basic Model
Consider an economy with n = 1, . . . , N competitive industries each producing a homogeneous
and unique product. Each product is produced using intermediate and non-intermediate
inputs and can be used as an input of other industries or be consumed by final consumers.
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Given this general picture, I assume an analytically tractable structure that can be connected
to the input-output tables of an economy. I first describe the economic environment and then
characterize the competitive equilibrium.









αkn + αn = 1 (1)
where xn is the production of industry n, vn is the value-adding input,
5 and xkn is the amount
of product k as an intermediate input of industry n. The factor coefficients αn and αkn
determine the technology in each industry and correspond to input-output coefficients. Higher∑
k αkn reflects that the industry n relies more on intermediate inputs than value-adding
inputs. In comparison, higher
∑
k αnk reflects more consumption of product n as intermediate
input than final good.
The market of the value-adding input v is competitive and I take its price as the numeraire.
In equilibrium, pn is the price by which the product n is traded. Under perfect competition,
the profit of a representative firm in industry n becomes
πn = pnxn −
N∑
k=1
pkxkn − vn (2)




xn, vn = αnpnxn (3)












At the demand side, each product is used either as an intermediate input or for final
consumption. By denoting the final consumption of the product of industry n as x0n, one can
4The results of the model is robust to assuming a general CES function.
5For simplicity, vn represents all inputs other than intermediate goods. Because, my final goal is modeling
VAT, intermediate goods correspond to taxable goods and services. More general assumption would be adding
labor and other non-intermediate factors of value-added in the production function and using la1n k
a2
n . . . instead
of vn, but it complicates the model without changing the qualitative results.
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write total representative demand of industry n as




where the first term shows the final demand and the second term is the sum of all intermediate
demands of product n. Assume that final consumers are homogeneous with a net income w and
a Cobb-Douglas utility in the sense that the utility maximization problem for a representative
final consumer is






βi = 1, s.t.
N∑
i=1
pix0i = w (6)
where βi determines per-unit fraction of the consumers’ incomes used in purchasing good i.
The solution of (6) gives the final demand of each product n as x0n = wβn/pn.
The representative production and demand are equal in all industries at equilibrium and
by substituting x0n and xnk from (3) in (5), we can write









Define yn = pnxn as representative value of production in industry n. Then,




(8) expresses that the total value of production of commodity n is equal to the value that
is bought by final consumers, who spend a fraction βn of their total wealth on it, plus the
intermediate demand of other industries. The share of the value of product n consumed as
the input of k in total value of output of k is αnk. To find the equilibrium value of production
in each industry, I employ vectors Y and B with dimensionality N × 1 containing yn and βn
respectively, together with an N×N matrix A built by αkn as elements.6 Then, (8) is written
as
Y = wB + AY, ⇒ Y = (I −A)−1wB. (9)
Since wB > 0, (9) imposes that AY < Y . In this case, (I−A)−1 in (9) always exists meaning
6Throughout the paper, lower-case letters like x denotes a scalar, upper-case like X a vector, and bold
upper-case like X a matrix.
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Therefore, Y = (I+A+A2 + . . . )wB, where AmwB is the indirect effect of final consumption
wB in rising the value of production of Y through m intermediate goods in between. In the
following, I first introduce the concepts of forward and backward linkages, then in the next
section, I model formal and informal sector in this economy.
2.1 Forward and backward linkages
The above model provides a simple framework to study the effect of inter-sectoral linkages.
I introduce two types of linkages indices in this regard: forward linkage which quantifies the
value of products that is sold to the other industries (not final consumers), and backward
linkage, which indexes the value of products purchased from other industries. Figure 2 shows
a simple example of a network of 6 industries, where there are two vertical chains, each
including a raw material supplier (S), a manufacturer (M), and a retailer (R), such that S
is the upstream and R is the downstream industry. In other words, in each chain S is just
forwardly linked, R just backwardly and M has both types of linkages. These two production







0 0 α13 0 0 0
0 0 0 α24 0 0
0 0 0 α34 α35 0
0 0 0 0 0 α46
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

Figure 2: A simple industry network and the corresponding input-output table A. Industry S1
is forwardly linked to M3 (direct linkage) and M4, R5, and R6 (indirect linkages). In comparison, Industry
R6 is backwardly linked to M4 (direct linkage) and M3, S1, and S2 (indirect linkages).
in addition to M3 and R5, is forwardly linked with M4 and R6 through M3. Similarly, the
backward linkages of R6 include the direct linkage of M4 and indirect linkages of S1, S2 and
M3 through M4.
7See Ten Raa (2006), Theorem 2.2.
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We can gauge these two properties using input-output coefficients. For simplicity assume
that the production value in all industries is one. Then, direct forward linkage of n to k –
which is also the direct backward linkages of k to n – is reflected in αnk. Similarly, the indirect
linkages from n to k through industry j can be gauged by αnjαjk. Therefore in Figure 2, a
measure for the forward linkages of S1 would be α13 + α13α34 + α13α35 + α13α34α46, which is
the increase in production of S1 in response to one unit increase in the production of all other
industries. Similarly the backward linkages of R6 can be gauged by α46 + α24α46 + α34α46 +
α13α34α46 as the increase in the production of all other industries in response to one unit
increase in the production of R6.
A general formula for forward and backward linkages is first introduced by Rasmussen
(1957). He suggests using the row and column sums of the Leontief inverse of the industry×industry
table of the economy which is computed using the corresponding input-output transaction ta-
bles. Using the same approach, I define the following formulas for forward and backward
linkages vectors:
Forward linkage: FL = (I − Y −1AY )−1J (10)
Backward linkage: BL = (I −A′)−1J (11)
where Y is a diagonal matrix of vector Y in the sense that diag(Y ) = Y , A′ is the transpose
of A, and J is a vector of ones (summation vector). If we expand (10) and (11) for each
element, it gives the coefficients of each industry n as
















+ . . . (12)











αjkαkn + . . . (13)
fln shows how much is the value of production that goes to the other industries and not
final consumers (the sum of all αnkyk, αnkαkjyj, . . . ), normalized by yn. It includes both
direct linkages (customers) and indirect linkages through intermediate goods (customers of
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customers). Similarly bln measures the value of inputs that comes from other industries,
directly or indirectly (the sum of all αknyn, αjkαknyn, . . . ), normalized by yn. The important
difference between fln and bln is that “n” is the first subscript in all terms of fln reflecting
the output flow to other industries, while in bln, “n” is the last subscript reflecting the input
requirements from other industries.
Note that these two indices are independent of each other. There may be an industry
that has strong linkages in both directions or none of them. For instance, some primitive
agricultural products or household activities are directly consumed to the final consumers.
Hence, they possess no forward or backward linkages. In comparison, steel is a good example
of an industry that has both types of linkages: coal and iron ore are backward and many items
like canned goods are its forward industries. Furthermore, the two above linkage concepts
cover both vertical and horizontal inter-industry connections. The vertical linkage is a chain
of industries from up to downstream producing a final good (e.g. petroleum industries from
crude oil extraction to plastics), but horizontal linkage is between two industries exchanging
their differentiated products and none of them is necessarily categorized above or below the
other (e.g. Fuels and Iron industries). The great advantage of the above indices is the inclusion
of all types of linkages of a complex industry network in two simple and measurable formulas
(10) and (11).
3 Adding the VAT and modeling informality
Now return to the basic model and consider the government imposes a uniform VAT rate
t in all industries and fines all non-registered firms that are detected. Formal (informal)
status is then defined as registered and fully tax compliant (not registered) for the VAT.8 In
order to characterize formal and informal sectors, I follow the framework used by Piggott and
Whalley (2001), Keen (2008), and Stiglitz (2009). In each industry, consider two formal and
informal markets that both are competitive and produce the same product. Formal firms have
constant returns and informal firms have decreasing returns due to the expected fine for VAT
evasion. The simplifying assumption used in this structure is the absence of occupational
8Although this definition ignores the possibility of misreporting in the formal sector, one can assume each
representative firm sells one part of its production in the formal market (xfn) and one part in the informal (x
i
n).
In this case, as shown below, if the expected fine of producing xin is the same as an informal firm with that
level of production, the results do not change. For detailed analysis of misreporting in the VAT see Hoseini
(2014).
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choice and transition between the two sectors. In fact, the economy is considered to be
composed of two types of producers with high and low abilities who can only work as formal
and as informal respectively. In this setting, the two perfectly competitive sectors can co-exist
in all industries and response in size to the tax enforcement policy. The advantage of this
assumption is generating analytically tractable results in my model.9
Under the VAT, the ad valorem tax in industry n is added to its market price pn, in the
sense that formal firms charge tax on their sales and issue the corresponding invoices for the
buyers, who if registered can use this invoice to refund against their own tax liability. Informal
firms, on the other hand, buy and sell at tax inclusive price, but they do not pay any tax to
the government.
As an example, consider a simple production chain for a final good R with three stages:
raw material supplier (S), manufacturer (M), and retailer (R) such that their pre-tax prices




Therefore, at the first stage, one unit of S transforms to one unit of M and then, at the second
stage, the new product changes to one unit of final consumer good R. Table 1 shows the
balance sheet of each industry if they register under the VAT or not.
Table 1: Prices and revenues under the VAT.
industry output price input price tax payment profit























Si pS + tpS 0 0 (1 + t)pSx
i
S − cS
Mi pM + tpM pS + tpS 0 (1 + t)(pMx
i
M − pSxiS)− cM
Ri pR + tpR pM + tpM 0 (1 + t)(pRx
i
R − pMxiM )− cR
The superscript f represents formal sector and i informal. The difference between the two
groups is that informal firms do not pay the tax to the government, but instead have a risk
of detection and punishment by the tax administration equal to cn. In the general model
with N industries the same pattern holds. According to Table 1, tax earnings cancel out the
9Another way of modeling informality is assuming heterogeneous producers with different abilities who can
freely choose to be formal or informal (Rauch, 1991; Fortin et al., 1997; De Paula and Scheinkman, 2010). In
these models, there is a size constraint for informal firms that leads to a cut-off ability above which producers
become formal and vice-versa. For illustrative purposes I do not choose this approach, because as I discuss
below, it complicates the analysis without providing any additional insight.
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n ≥ 0 (14)
which is similar to (2) and gives (4) as equilibrium prices.
Table 1 shows that informal firms benefit from evading the VAT, but bear a cost cn.
This cost reflects the risk of being detected and punished by the tax administration due to
not registering for the VAT. I assume the evasion cost is a convex function of the level of
production xin, and thus the production of informal firms is subject to decreasing returns
reflecting the expected loss from VAT evasion.10 Following Allingham and Sandmo (1972),
the literature on tax evasion normally assumes that the cost of evasion cn depends on two
factors. One is the value of the fine, reasonably proportional to the evasion level, and the
other is the probability of detection the fraud (for a survey see Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002).
In this model, I include these properties in the following simple form:
cn(en, ηn) = θηnen, 0 ≤ ηn ≤ 1 (15)
where ηn and en are detection probability and evasion level, respectively. θ > 1 is the punish-
ment per unit of evasion set by the government based on legal and political considerations.
It should be greater than one, otherwise the marginal benefit of informality always beats its
costs. Therefore, the profit function of a representative firm in the informal sector of industry
n is written as







kn − vin − θηnen, xin ≥ 0. (16)
Proposition 1 Under perfect competition, the production of a representative firm in the in-
10As mentioned above, this assumption allows for the coexistence of formal and informal markets in the sense
that the informal sector produce at a specific level and the rest of demand is supplied by formal firms. Boadway
and Sato (2009) and De Paula and Scheinkman (2010) endogenize the occupational choice by assuming that
formal status has positive impact on firm’s profit due to access to formal services (e.g. financial intermediation,
access to capital market, hiring skilled workers), and arguing the extent of these advantages depends on the
managerial ability of the firm. In this model, one can consider a same structure with a continuum of producers
with different abilities and assume that the abilitiy adds a new term to the profit in the formal sector. Then
above a cut-off ability, firms become formal and vice versa. This assumption however is not determinant and
do not alter the theoretical predictions of the model.
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Proof 1 Appendix A.1.
According to Proposition 1, to compute the informal production of each industry, we need
to know the functional form of detection probability ηn. In the next section, I discuss in detail
how we can mathematically define this function and link it with the self-enforcing feature of
the VAT. After finding the representative production of the informal sector from Proposition
1, we have yin = pnx
i
n. Then, the representative formal production in each industry can be
computed as yfn = yn − yin, where the representative total production yn is determined by
input-output equation (9). The desired formality index for the tax administration is yfn/yn
which is the share of formal production in each industry.
3.1 Probability of detection
Before any further analysis, we need a reasonable assumption about the probability of detec-
tion ηn. Broadly, there are two information sources for the tax administration to check the
business records. One is within-firm information such as profit and wages, the other is external
information like transactions with other businesses. Detection of within-firm information is
usually done by visiting audit, but the external information is attainable by cross-checking the
transaction records of business partners. In the following, I first explain these factors and how
the administration can exploit them and then I define a functional form for this probability.
3.1.1 Firm size
A crucial factor that determines tax evasion is the firm size. Kleven et al. (2015) show that
although theoretically a firm can collude with its employees to unreport its tax liability, in
practice, if the number of employees is large, maintaining such collusion becomes very difficult.
They indicate this collusion may break for a number of reasons. The first set is a random
shock due to unplanned events such as a conflict between employer and employee, moral
concerns of a newly hired employee, or a mistake of an employee or employer to reveal the
records to the tax administration. The other reason can be rational whistle blowing because
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of a rewards by the tax administration which is common in several countries.11 In addition,
as an enterprise grows, the possibility of evasion decreases. Therefore, this type of third-party
reporting dramatically improves tax enforcement of bigger firms. To incorporate this effect
in the probability function of an informal firm, I use the size of the firm xin. To ensure that
the probability always lies between zero and one, I divide this term by x̄ which represents the
size in which the firm is always detected. Hence, xin/x̄ reflects the chance of detection by a
visiting audit.
3.1.2 Firm-to-firm transactions
The second source of information for the tax administration is arm’s-length transactions of
the firm (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006). This source is especially important in the VAT
because formal firms are required to keep the records of their sales and purchases, enabling
the administration to verify them with the accounts of their business partners. In practice,
there are different methods of VAT administration based on the type of assessment, technology
and invoice reporting, but in all types, firms either have to keep the sales and purchase invoices
for some years or send them to the tax administration with their tax report.12 Regardless of
the methods of administration, formal traders always have a strong incentive to report their
purchase invoices, because they can deduct input taxes from their VAT bill. Each purchase
invoice, as a third-party reported piece of information, enables the authority to investigate
formality and registration status of the seller. In other words, the incentive of formal clients
to report the transaction for getting input credit makes an additional risk of detection for the
informal supplier.
This feature of the VAT, which is labeled as self-enforcing property (Keen and Smith,
2006), is a one-way effect from formal firms to their supplier not costumers. In her “spillover
experiment”, Pomeranz (2015) reports that when the Chilean tax authority randomly sends an
announcement of audit to half of the suspected firms, the announcement reduces the evasion
among the suppliers but not clients of the treated firms. The reason is that when a formal
firm sells a product, it charges VAT and issues the invoice irrespective of the buyer’s type.
If the buyer is a formal firm, it uses the invoice for input credit and the two records – tax
11Kleven et al. (2015) mention some example from OECD countries like the US and Japan.
12With the new developments in electronic invoicing, in many countries firms report each single invoice
to the tax administration electronically with substantially less compliance cost. This enables the adminis-
tration to perform cross-checking without visiting the firm. For more information on different types of VAT
administration see Ebrill et al. (2001) and Hoseini (2014).
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payment and formal buyer’s input credit claim – enables the tax administration to cross-check
them together. Otherwise, the administration only receives a payment and be informed that
the product is sold, regardless of whether the buyer is an informal firm or a final consumer.
Thus, when the seller is formal but the buyer is not, the tax administration cannot distinguish
between the ones that should be punished (informal firms) and not punished (final consumers).
To incorporate the self-enforcing feature in the detection probability, I assume that the risk
of being detected by invoice cross-checking is positively associated with the share of formal
customers, who inform the tax administration about the transaction. Hence, in addition to
firms size, the detection probability is an increasing function of the share of sales to formal




nk/xn. Notice that because both markets are
perfectly competitive, a single informal firm cannot change xn by changing its own production
level and takes it as given when optimizing profit.
To formulate detection probability ηn, we need to specify the policy variables and define a
function to put size and cross-checking risks together. The tax administration has two types
of policies to make: 1) the allocation of enforcement expenditure across industries, 2) the
allocation of enforcement type (vising audit versus cross-checking) within each industry. I
assume that the administration’s policy in each industry is primarily reflected in parameter
φn = gn/ḡ, where gn is the expenditure to enforce tax in industry n and ḡ is a fixed term to
ensure 0 ≤ φn ≤ 1. For the first policy, the administration seeks to find the optimal allocation
of gn – and consequently φn – across different industries for maximizing net VAT revenue.
The second policy parameter is the share λn of the enforcement φn to dedicate for invoice
cross-checking which means how much the administration tries to find and check the seller
of a purchase invoice claimed by a formal customer. Therefore, λnφn determines the level of
invoice cross-checking and (1 − λn)φn reflects revealing insider information in each industry.







risk of detection thourgh within-firm information
+







0 ≤ φn ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λn ≤ 1. (18)
When the enforcement expenditure gn in an industry n goes up, φn approaches one and the
tax administration finds the informal firms in that industry with a higher probability.
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4 Market equilibrium and optimal enforcement
Given the two instruments to enforce the VAT, in this part, I find the equilibrium informal
production by evaluating the response of informal firms to the enforcement policy. To reduce
the risk of unintentional mistakes and whistle-blowing threat, informal firms can control their
size. Therefore, they cannot grow as formal firms and their size in this regard depends on
the detection possibilities of the tax administration which is reflected in (1−λn)φnxin/x̄. The
second risk of detection is through invoice cross-checking of business transactions. To reduce
this risk, informal firms should pay attention to their customers’ type. An informal firm has
two choices regarding the cross-checking risk: (I) selling the product to all business customers
irrespective of their type, (II) not selling to formal customers and match with informal firms.
In action (I), the informal firm sells to both formal and informal clients and may issue
a fake invoice for formal customers, resulting in a risk of detection by cross-checking. The
advantage of this action is selling the product at the tax inclusive price and earning a money






kn). This action can be a desirable
strategy when the bulk of customers of the firm are informal and the invoice cross-checking
rate λn is small in industry n. In comparison, action (II) is matching with an informal client,
who cannot apply for input credit, to be insured against the cross-checking risk. However, in
this action, in order to persuade the informal client to match, the firm has to share part of
the VAT evasion with the buyer. Therefore, if an informal firm in industry n chooses action
(II), its gain of evasion is less than en.
To characterize the equilibrium after action (II), I assume the informal customers agree
to match if they receive a share µ ∈ [0, 1] of the seller’s gain of matching. Given the form
of cost function in (15), when cross-checking is optimal for the administration, the expected





13 Thus, in industry n, while the
evasion gain of the informal seller choosing action (I) is en, in case it chooses action (II), this





We can find the turning point that informal firms decide between the two actions by
comparing the profit in each case. Under action (I), the detection probability ηn is equal
13To find this, note that based on the magnitude of the risk that each information source reveals, the
detection probability ηn is either increasing or decreasing in λn (I show this formally in Proposition 3). In
other words, the optimal cross-checking share λn for the administration is either zero or one. If λn = 0, the
firm’s best response is action (I), but if λn = 1 they choose (II) and the equilibrium becomes assortative
matching (see Appendix A.5). Thus, when cross-checking is optimal for the administration, the gain of






to (18) and overall profit is computed by substituting (18) into (16). Under action (II),
the cross-checking risk is removed from the detection probability and we would have ηn =
φn(1 − λn)xin/x̄. Instead, the matching cost is subtracted from the overall profit (16). With
straightforward calculations, we can show that the difference in profits of action (I) and (II)
is






If λn ≤ µ, which means the average cost of matching is higher than the risk of cross-checking,
the informal firms in industry n prefer action (I). If λn > µ, informal firms match with
informal customers and only supply informal demand. This results in an assortative matching
equilibrium similar to De Paula and Scheinkman (2010), in the sense that formal and informal
firms trade with the same type shaping two parallel markets.
For illustrative purposes and keep some level of mathematical simplicity, I study assortative
matching equilibrium, which lead to the similar results, in Appendix A.5. Here, I just mention
that λn > µ is optimal for the administration only if market demand is binding for informal
firms and they produce below their optimal level. In the following, I assume informal firms
produce at their optimum and study the pattern of formality and optimal enforcement across
different industries based on their linkages. The below proposition shows the equilibrium
relationship between formality defined as fn = y
f
n/yn, government enforcement, and forward
linkages.
Proposition 2 Formality is positively associated with forward linkages in each industry such
that we have






fk and F = (I − Y −1ΓAY )−1F̃ (20)
where f̃n = 1− x̄2θφn(1−λn)xn , γn =
min[λn,µ]x̄
2(1−λn)xn , F(N×1) and F̃(N×1) are vectors containing f1 . . . fN
and f̃1 . . . f̃N respectively, and Γ(N×N) is a diagonal matrix consisting γ1 . . . γN as diagonal
elements.
Proof 2 Appendix A.2
The effort of the administration to exploit within-firm information to detect informality in
industry n is reflected in φn(1 − λn) and f̃n is the formality caused by that. Therefore, the
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formula for f̃n intuitively indicates that the more effort of tax administration and higher
punishment θ reduces the size of informal market.
While f̃n is the formalization due to direct enforcement in activity n, the second term re-
flects the formality transmission by the self-enforcing property. In fact, the particular interest
of Proposition 2 is showing how formality in one industry spread to others. From (10), we
can see (I − Y −1ΓAY )−1 is a matrix of forward linkages14 and by expansion we can write
F = (I + Y −1ΓAY + Y −1(ΓA)2Y + . . . )F̃ (21)
where Y −1(ΓA)tY F̃ is the indirect effect of formality in other industries in rising the formality
of an industry through t intermediate goods in between. This equation shows how formality




















formal customers through one intermediate good
(formal customers of customers)
+ . . . (22)
where f̃n is formality caused by revealing within-firm information and the next terms gauge
the spill-overs of the transmission of formality caused by direct or indirect formal customers
of n. Therefore, by utilizing the self-enforcing feature of the VAT, tax administration can
increase the formal sector size from f̃n to fn.









The left hand side of (23) is the direct effect of forward linkages in (22). Thus, we can
conclude that the forward linkages of an industry is negatively related to its final demand
share.15 Consequently, an activity with more final demand in total production is more likely
14The forward linkage index is not completely the same as (10) and has an additional term Γ consisting of
γn as diagonal elements. The formula of γn shows that it is determined by cross-checking share λn and is like
a policy variable set by the administration. If it is set equal to 1 in all industries, the linkages index becomes
equal to (11), otherwise γn acts as a fixed weight to the linkages of each industry to compute the linkages.
Later, I discuss how the weights are determined at the optimum.
15w is the net-of-tax income, and in the presence of a homogeneous VAT, w represents gross household
income divided by 1 + t.
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to be informal and has a lower tax registration rate. Note that, using final consumption
share only takes into account the direct linkages and not indirect linkages effect from formal
customers of customers.
4.1 Optimal Enforcement
After characterizing the formality of each industry, in this section, I derive the optimal enforce-
ment policies to control informality. The objective of the tax administration is maximizing
total VAT revenue subtracted by total enforcement expenditure. The VAT revenue for each
























n = tαnynfn (24)
On the other hand, the administration faces an enforcement expense gn in each industry
which determines the parameter φn in detection probability. If gn approaches zero, detection
becomes infeasible and if it goes up φn approaches one. Knowing revenues and costs, we can







tαnynfn − gn (25)
The next two propositions indicates the optimal share of cross-checking and enforcement
expenditure in each industry.
Proposition 3 The optimal share of cross-checking in total enforcement spending of each
























Proof 3 Appendix A.3.
The two sides of the inequalities are the two sources of information that characterize
detection probability in (18). This proposition states that cross-checking is optimal in industry
n when it increases detection probability at least twice higher than the firm size threat.16 In
16Factor 2 is due to the quadratic functional form of the cost of evasion in xin. If the cost function has
higher degree of convexity this number increases and vice-versa.
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this case, the tax administration should put effort into cross-checking as much as it does
not persuade informal firms to match with their peers. Moreover, the right-hand side of
the inequality condition is an indicator of forward linkages – see the second term of (20).
Therefore, λn is positively associated with forward linkages of an industry.
Proposition 4 The optimal expenditure for tax enforcement in industry n is positively cor-





where G2 and A are two N × 1 vector with elements g2n and αn respectively, A is defined as




Proof 4 Appendix A.4.












αjγjαjkγkαkn + . . . ) (28)
The immediate result of the Proposition 4 is that the optimal expenditure to enforce tax in
each industry depends on the square root of the tax rate divided by the punishment multiplier.
Indeed,
√
tḡx̄/2θ determines the scale of expenditure the administration has to spend. More-
over, the value of one unit of output pn and the inverse of the share of within-firm information
in enforcement policy 1− λn increase the optimal enforcement expenditure in the industry.
Apart from these effects, (28) shows that the optimal expenditure is positively associated
with backward linkages of the industry defined as (I − A′Γ)−1. This reflects the fact that
the self-enforcement property of the VAT is from costumers to suppliers not vice-versa. In
other words, backwardly linked industries are directly or indirectly customers of forwardly
linked ones, so their compliance leads to higher compliance of their suppliers. Therefore, they
are better cases for regular tax audit than not backwardly linked industries. This result is
of particular interest since it provides a reduce-form expression for optimal enforcement that
accounts for formality transmission through input-output linkages.
The backward linkage index used in Proposition 4 is to some extent different from (11),
introduced by Rasmussen (1957). The main difference is the appearance of γn ∝ λn/(1− λn)
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in (28). As shown in Proposition 3, if forward linkages of n is high enough, the optimal policy
is λn = µ, otherwise λn = 0. Therefore, γn act as a weight for measuring backward linkages
that overstates the linkages with the suppliers that have strong forward linkages, but rules
out the linkages with industries that have low forward linkages with λn = 0.
Putting Propositions 4 and 3 together yields the implication of interest: The tax admin-
istration should spend more to reveal within-firm information of backwardly linked industries
and make more cross-checking in forwardly linked ones. For instance, in the simple example
of Table 1, the administration should put more effort on the downstream R and try to reveal
the within-firm information in this industry (e.g. visiting audit, tempting reward for whistle-
blowers). But in S, it should dedicate the spending to check the invoices and transactions.
5 Empirical evidence
This section provides evidence about the existence of the VAT self-enforcement and its mea-
surement from the Indian service sector. India is an ideal country for testing this hypothesis
given the big size of its shadow economy, large variation in demographics, and policy reforms.
The taxes in India are levied by both central and state governments. The central taxes are
levied on non-agricultural income and wealth, corporate income and profit, customs duties,
excise duties on manufactured products, and services tax. The main state level taxes include
states’ sales tax, stamp duties and registration fees, motor vehicles tax, agricultural income
tax, entertainment tax, profession tax, and electricity duty.
Initiated in 1985 during Rajiv Gandhi’s government, Indian taxation system experienced
substantial reforms in different directions following to the fiscal crisis and the subsequent
liberalization in 1991. The reforms, in a nutshell, led to (i) a substantial reduction in income,
profit and wealth tax rates, (ii) a great tariff cut in custom duties, (iii) gradual transformation
of central excise duties to the VAT, (iv) service taxes introduction in 1994 and VAT adoption
in 2003, (v) changing states’ sales tax to state-VAT (in 2005 for the bulk of states), and (vi)
administrative improvements. Online Appendix provides the time-line of major tax reforms
in India. For more detail on these reforms see Rao and Rao (2006, 2009).
In this paper, I concentrate on service sector of India given service VAT adoption in 2003-
04, which provides a natural experiment for testing the link between inter-sectoral linkages
and VAT compliance. Service tax in India is levied just by the central (not state) government.
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It was introduced in 1994 on insurance and stock brokerages, and overtime gradually more
service activities added to the list. The major change happened in 2003-04 by introducing the
VAT in service tax and expanding the coverage of the rule to more than 80 activities. After an
initial experimentation in 2002-03 for the service inputs, the government budget for 2003-04
made available the credit for taxes paid on inputs to all listed services. Before this reform,
the credit for business inputs was not available and service tax – on a number of activities –
was charged on purchases by both firms and final consumers. The rate of service tax also has
experienced a number of changes. Being 5% initially, the rate increased to 8% in 2003 and
then 10.2% in 2004. In the mid-2006, it again rose to 12.24%, and then reduced to 10.3% in
2009.17
Given the nation-wide service tax policy change in India, I examine the existence of self-
enforcing feature by testing whether the VAT has been more effective in reducing the size
of shadow economy of forwardly linked activities or not. As shown in Proposition 2, the
idea behind this hypothesis is that naturally, firms with strong forward linkages have more
business customers and among them formal traders who prefer to buy from VAT compliant
suppliers. Thus, after VAT adoption, we expect more tax compliance in forwardly linked
activities. For this purpose, I use different data sources; two firm-level surveys on services,
and the input-output tables of Indian economy.
5.1 Data
The principal data I use are two consistent surveys on “unorganized service sector” by NSSO18
which are carried out in 2001-02 (round 57) and 2006-07 (round 63). They have nation-wide
representative samples of service enterprises using economic census as the framework and
include a variety of information including the status of tax registration. The 2006-07 survey
has a specific question about tax registration and whether the firm has tax account number
(TAN). In the 2001-02 survey, among other types of registration, the enterprise is asked about
states’ sales tax and companies act registration (which includes tax registration). To cover
other types of tax, I check whether the tax payments of the enterprise are nonzero or not.19
17These facts are obtained from Rao and Rao (2009) and http://indiataxes.com.
18National Sample Survey Organization, which is under Ministry of statistic of India and conducts a variety
of surveys including enterprise level on unorganized manufacturing and services. In India, the “organized”
sector typically includes enterprises in the public sector and firms registered under the Factories Act, 1948.
19As an alternative measure, using registration under companies act to define formal status in both surveys
leads to virtually identical results. It is good to mention that all NSSO surveys are conducted independent of
tax purposes and no information about the identity of the enterprise is supposed to go to the other agencies. As
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In both surveys, the sample is highly stratified with a clear distinction between rural and
urban areas. The first stage units (FSU) are villages in the rural areas and Urban Frame
Survey blocks in the urban areas. The numbers of FSUs are 15,869 and 13,271 in round
57 and 63 respectively. Altogether 244,376 enterprises in 2001-02 and 189,844 enterprises in
2006-07 were surveyed. The services they cover consist of transport, storage, communica-
tion, hotels and restaurants, real estate, financial intermediation (just round 63), renting and
business activities, education, health, social work, and other community, social and personal
service activities. The sample excludes government and public sector undertakings and the
units registered under the Factories Act. To have a balanced sample, I drop the financial
intermediation services that are just surveyed in 2006.
The second data source, which is used to measure forward and backward linkages,
is input-output transaction tables of the national accounts statistics of Indian economy pub-
lished by Central Statistical Organization in 2003-04. The input-output tables consist of 130
activities including 22 service categories20 and include use (commodity × industry) and make
(industry × commodity) matrices. Using these two, one can construct the (commodity ×
commodity) coefficient matrix A.21 Then, similar to (10) and (11), I compute forward and
backward linkages in each service sector as
FL = Y −1(I −A)−1Y J, BL = (I −A′)−1J (29)
Where X is the diagonal production matrix and J the summation vector. The final consump-
tion and total demand of each service, used in Figure 1, are drawn from input-output tables
too.
it mentioned in the manual, according to the Collection of Statistics Act, violation of any of the confidentiality
and secrecy of the information by statistics officer or field staff is prosecuted by or with the consent of
appropriate agency.
20Railway transport, Land transport, Water transport, Air transport, auxiliary transport activities, Storage
and warehousing, Communication, Trade, Hotels and restaurants, Banking, Insurance, Ownership of dwellings,
Education and research, Medical and health, Business services, Computer & related activities, Legal services,
Real estate activities, Renting of machinery and equipment, Community, social and personal services, Other
services, Public administration.
21The methodology for calculating matrix A from use and make tables are available in the Appendix
2 of the manual of Input-Output Transaction Tables: “Mathematical expression on the methodology of
























Not under VAT rule in 2006
Under VAT rule in 2006
Figure 3: Tax registration rate before and after VAT adoption in 2003. The activities are divided based on
the applicability of the service tax rule in 2006. The white bars are the average registration rate in activities
that are not listed in service VAT rule until 2006 and the dark bars show the average tax registration rate of
activities included in service VAT rule till 2006.
5.2 Overall change in tax compliance of service sector in 2001-2006
Having firms’ tax registration status enables me to estimate the size of shadow economy at
state-year-activity level using the sample weights. Tax registration status is not specific to
the service tax and it refers to all types of registration for central or state government tax
agencies. Figure 1 in the introduction, uses the percentage of tax registered firms in each
activity – using the sample weights and separately for 2001 and 2006 – in the y-axis. I use
the same index in Figure 3 to compares the change in tax registration rate of the services
available in the two rounds by decomposing them based on VAT adoption. In particular, the
white bars are the average registration rate in activities that are not listed in service VAT
rule until 2006 and the dark bars show the average tax registration rate of activities included
in service VAT rule till 2006.22 In other words, between 2001 and 2006, the latter was under
VAT treatment and the former was as the control group.
In 2001-02, the tax registration rates of the activities excluded and included in service tax
22The registration rate per year and per activity is available in the online appendix. The classification of
services in the NSS surveys are based on 5-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC) code. The number
of activities added to the service tax rule till 2006 is 94, but some of them are sub-categories of one 5-digit
NIC code. For instance, business auxiliary services, opinion poll, and intellectual property service activities,
having a same NIC (74130), are listed as three separate activities in service tax rule. In addition, some other
activities under service tax rule are in financial intermediation or trade sectors that are excluded from surveys.
The profile of each activity under service tax rule is available at http://www.servicetax.gov.in/
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rule till 2006 were quite close. On average 6.19% of the enterprises in the first group and
6.77% of the enterprises in the second group were registered under tax administrations. In
contrast, these numbers respectively are 9.5% and 13.08% in 2006, meaning around 3% and
6% more registration compared to 2001. To examine the robustness of the measurements, we
can compare these numbers with the overall tax collection trend of India. According to World
Bank WDI database tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in India grew from 7.94% in 2001 to
11.03% in 2006. This increase coincides with the major reforms in tax administration by the
government of India during this period. Notably, lunching Tax Information Network, Perma-
nent Account Number (PAN) card service, and Online Tax Accounting System (OLTAS) in
January 2004, and extending the legal requirement for filing tax return23 were some important
steps in improving tax administration efficiency in 2001-2006.
In addition to overall growth in tax compliance, Figure 3 shows that between two years
before and three years after introduction of the VAT in service tax, the tax registration rate
of the activities that the service tax rule applied to grew 3.2% more than the rest. Although
administrative advantages and self-enforcing feature of the VAT can be one reason for this
evidence, it can also because of higher effort of the tax administration in the activities under
service tax rule. In fact, the adoption of service tax in an activity increases its tax capacity
for the administration because it is subject to both direct (income and profit tax) and indirect
(service tax) taxes. In contrast, in the other activities that only direct taxes apply the potential
tax revenue per firm is relatively less.
5.3 Methodology and summary statistics
To remove the tax effort bias due to service tax adoption from the sample, I drop all services
that were not under service tax rule in 2006. In this way, I also eliminate any potential selection
bias for activities that are chosen by the government for service tax adoption. Furthermore,
because the model characterizes the consequences of VAT adoption – not a change in tax
regime from a cascading tax to a VAT – I drop the activities that were added to the service
tax rule schedule before 2001. Indeed, without the input refund, service tax is charged at
multiple stages of value-added network and “cascades” down to the final stage. The removal of
the cascading distortions, may alter the model’s predictions and complicate the interpretation
23All individuals living in large cities who satisfy at least one of the conditions (ownership of house, cars,
membership of a club, ownership of credit card, foreign travel, and subscriber of a telephone connection)
became required to file their tax return
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of results. Hence in below estimations, the sample only includes activities that were under
service tax rule in 2006 but not in 2001. Finally, hair dressing and other beauty treatment
services (NIC code 93020) is dropped, because service tax is applied only to beauty treatment
not hair dressing and decomposition is not possible. After applying these data cleaning steps,
43 activities remain in the sample which are described in appendix Table A.2.
In order to measure formality, I use two indices: First, tax registration rate is the
percentage of firms registered under tax authorities (the same index used in Figure 1 and
Figure 3) within each state, year, and activity. Second, I define formal and informal production
as the level of production that is produced by firms registered and not registered under tax
respectively. Then, the formal production share refers to the percentage of total production
by firms that are registered for central or state tax agencies within each state, year, and
activity.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of formality indices for 2001-02 and 2006-07. Tax
registration rate grew from 6.59% in 2001 to 10.81% in 2006 with an average of 8.71 percent.
Moreover, while in the whole sample 15.63% of production is produced by formal sector,
formality increased from 11.27% in 2001 to 19.95% in 2006.24 Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2
provide the average formality across state and activities respectively. We note a large variation
in formality across states and activities. Tax registration rate varies from less than 2% in Bihar
and Daman and Diu to over 20% in Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland. Furthermore, while
40% of service production is created by registered firms in Maharashtra, less than 2% of
production is formal in Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Looking into activities,
we observe less than one percent of firms working as outdoor caterer, fashion designer, and
sound recording services are registered for tax, whereas more than 90% are registered in air
transport services. Also, almost all of production in cargo handling in water transport is
formal, but this number is less than one percent for health club service.
Table 2 also presents the summary statistics of linkages measures that are used in estima-
tions. Forward and backward linkages indicators are on average 1.87 and 1.74 respectively, the
correlation between them is 0.26. Appendix Table A.2, presents the variation in the linkages
across activities. Storage and warehousing (NIC 2-digit code 63), telecommunication services
(NIC 2-digit code 64), and business services (NIC 2-digit code 74) are the most forwardly
linked services. In comparison, catering, road transport and storage and warehousing are the
24Note that these numbers are estimated for the sample of “unorganized service sector” as described above
and does not cover the whole service sector of India.
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most backwardly linked activities. Among all surveyed services, training and coaching (NIC
2-digit code 80) has the lowest linkages with other activities.
The last two variables in Table 2 are the average number of full-time workers per enterprise
and total number of firms in thousand in each state and activity. The former captures the
effect of firm size and third party reporting by labor, and the latter controls for the fixed
firm-level enforcement costs in the estimations. In the whole sample, the number of full-time
workers per enterprise and the number of firms per state and activity are on average 2.64 and
4812 respectively. However, service sector enterprises hire more full-time workers in 2006, but
the number of firms is bigger in 2001.
Table 2: Summary statistics– The numbers show the summary statistics average across states and
activities.
Sample 2001-02 2006-07 The whole sample
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Tax registeration rate 6.587 (15.76) 10.81 (21.96) 8.714 (19.24)
Formal production share 11.76 (23.58) 20.08 (31.98) 15.95 (28.42)
Forward linkages index 1.966 (0.606) 1.770 (0.589) 1.867 (0.605)
Backward linkages index 1.789 (0.407) 1.685 (0.358) 1.737 (0.387)
Average no. workers 2.488 (5.242) 2.786 (5.284) 2.638 (5.263)
Number of firms (’000) 5.106 (21.67) 4.521 (17.74) 4.812 (19.78)
To estimate the effect of service VAT adoption on the relative size of formal sector, I use
the following regression setup
fist = a0 + a1VATt + a2VATt × Li + a3Xist + Ii + Ss × Tt + εist (30)
where fist is formality index in activity i, state s and time t, VATt is equal to one in 2006
and zero in 2001, Li is one of the linkages indices in activity i, and Xist is a vector of control
variables including the average number of workers and total number of firms at activity, state,
and year level. In addition, Ii, Ss and Tt are vectors of activity, state, and time fixed effects.
By including state × year fixed effects in (30), I control for all state-level time-variant variables
and focus on the differential impact of forward and backward linkages interacted with VAT
dummy on formality. In the sample, there are 43 activities and 34 states, but some activities
do not exist in all states and the number of observations is 1119 in the regressions.
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5.4 VAT adoption, forward linkages and formalization
Table 3 illustrates the estimated coefficients of (30). As a first shot, I do not include the
linkages interaction term in column (1) to examine the overall impact of VAT adoption. After
controlling for size, firm population, and fixed effect, we find a positive and significant impact
of the year dummy of 2006 (post VAT adoption) on formality. Tax registration rate is 3.65%
higher in 2006 compared to 2001. Based on the numbers in Figure 3, we can assume half of
the increase in due to the other improvements in tax administration. If this is the case, VAT
adoption increases tax registration rate by 1.8% which is around one-fifth of 8.71%, the mean
of tax registration rate.
The sign of the average number of workers is positive and significant, suggesting higher
formal production in bigger firms with more employees. Having one additional worker in-
creases the chance of tax registration by one percent. This is consistent with the third party
reporting hypothesis of Kleven et al. (2015) which I used in section 3.1. The effect of total
number of firms is negative and significant which can reflect more difficult enforcement in the
presence of large number of firms and fixed firm-level administrative costs (Dharmapala et al.,
2011). When the number of firms increases by one thousand the chance of tax registration
decreases by 0.025%.
Column (2) to (4) of Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of (30) for specifica-
tions with only forward linkages, only backward linkages, and both types of linkages. In these
estimations, I control for state × year fixed effects, therefore, the overall improvements be-
tween the two years are captured with time dummies. Column (2) shows that activities with
higher forward linkages experience more formality after VAT adoption. For example, after
VAT adoption in 2003, registration rate of storage and warehousing activities (forward link-
ages=2.78) increased by 8.97 percentage point more than of training and coaching (forward
linkages=1.01).25 However, column (3) implies no significant relationship between tax regis-
tration and the interaction term of backward linkages. If we include both linkages indices in
one regression, forward linkages remains significant and backward linkages is still insignificant
with a sharp reduction in its coefficient (column 4). Similar to column (1), the average number
of workers and the number of firms appear with positive and negative signs respectively and
their coefficient is significant at 5% level in all specifications.
Column (5) to (8) present the estimation results when the dependent variable is formal
25The economic effect is computed as (2.78− 1.01)× 5.07 = 8.97
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share of production. Column (5) shows that from 2001 to 2006, formal production share
increased by 7.74%. If half of the increase is explained by VAT adoption, this number suggest
that the impact of VAT adoption on formal production share is 3.86%. In columns (6)-(8),
we obtain the same results for the impact of linkages on formal production share. Column
(6) suggests that the interaction term of VAT adoption and forward linkages is positively and
significantly associated with the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient of backward
linkages interacted with VAT adoption is however not significant (column 7). When both
of the interaction terms are included in the regression, only forward linkages is positive and
significant at 10% level.
To examine the robustness of the results, I conduct a number of additional tests that are
available at the online appendix. First, I change definition of formality to registration under
companies act – tax registration is its prerequisite – and virtually obtain the identical results.
Second, I recompute the linkages measures using the input-output tables of 2006 and observe
no change in estimation results.26 Finally, I include the sample of activities under service tax
rule before 2001 to increase the number of activities in the sample and find that the impact
of interaction term of forward linkages remains positive and significant.
In sum, the empirical evidence confirms a positive and strong impact of forward linkages
of an activity on tax registration and formal share of production when the VAT is conducted
in the economy. As shown in the model, the self-enforcing feature of the VAT is the main
reason for this effect. Hence, the degree of forward linkages of an activity – which can be
easily computed using input-output tables of the economy – provides a novel index for tax
administrations to measure VAT self-enforcement and move to a more efficient tax enforcement
policy.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides the insight that for optimal VAT enforcement, tax administration should
take account of the linkages between different activities. Many developing countries with
limited tax capacity have moved toward the VAT and the optimality of this reform crucially
depends on VAT collection efficiency. The administrative advantage of the VAT is that in
addition to common tools to reveal intra-firm information, it provides a unique third-party
26The input-output transaction tables of India are available for 1993, 1998 for 115 sectors and 2003 and




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reported information source via its invoice system. This intrinsic feature causes formality
to transmit to forwardly linked activities, because their evasion depends on their customers’
informality. Consequently, to formulate the enforcement, tax administration must take into
account the spillovers of transmission of formality to the suppliers. For this reason, more en-
forcement spending should be dedicated to the backwardly linked firms to reveal their internal
information. In comparison, tax administrations should spend it resources in forwardly linked
activities to cross-check invoices with the corresponding credit claims. Empirical evidence
from Indian economy shows that the self-enforcing feature among forwardly linked activities
increases formal share of production.
However, the underlying model has some limitations. Generally, this paper neglects some
other VAT enforcement issues, as stressed in Keen and Smith (2006), like under-reported
sales and over-reported purchases, multiple rates and misclassification of commodities, self-
consumption and carousel fraud. In an accompanying paper (Hoseini, 2014), the misreporting
in the VAT is studied in detail, but international aspect of VAT fraud like missing trader
(carousel) fraud, need more attention of theorists. In spite of these limitations, the findings
of this paper have a novel implication for the VAT enforcement design, specially for countries
suffering from big size of shadow economy.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
According to the Table 1, the amount of evasion en of a representative informal firm in industry






kn). Hence, we can rewrite (16) as











− vin, xin ≥ 0. (31)
By defining τn = t(1− θηn), we can write (31) as
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)∂xin
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− (1 + τn)pk = 0 (34)
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(36)
Next, by substituting vin and x
i





+ (1 + τn)pn = pn(1 + τn)
1−αn (37)





































and by substituting (39) into (37) and rearranging the expression, it turns out
∂τn
∂xin
xin = −(1 + τn)
(1 + τn)
αn − 1
(1 + τn)αn − 1 + αn
(40)
Since, 0 ≤ τn = t(1− θηn) < 1, and τn is small, I am able to simplify (40) by using the linear
approximation of (1 + τn)
αn as 1 + αnτn.
27 By doing this, we get
∂τn
∂xin
xin = −τn (41)




xin = 1− θηn (42)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2




n. If µ > λn
























Moreover, at the equilibrium, we have xin/xn = y
i














27Notice that the tax rate is between 0 and 1 (around 0.2 for many countries) and when it multiplies
by 0 < 1 − θηn < 1, it becomes even smaller. Therefore, the higher powers of τn are negligible for the
approximation. For instance, if τn = 0.1 and αn = 0.5, the true value and the first order approximation
become 1.0488 and 1.05, respectively, with only 0.1% error.
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If µ < λn and action (II) is chosen, then cross-checking risk is removed from the detection




nk/xn is subtracted from the
profit of informal firms. By applying both of these changes the profit of a representative
informal firm can be written in the same form as (32) with a change in the definition of τn
such that





























Therefore, by defining γn =
min[λn, µ]x̄
2(1− λn)xn











Next, I employ vectors F and F̃ with dimensionality N × 1 containing fn and 1 −
x̄
2θφn(1− λn)xn
, respectively; and Γ as a diagonal N × N matrices with γi as diagonal ele-
ments. Then, (49) is written as
F = F̃ + Y −1ΓAY F ⇒ F = (I − Y −1ΓAY )−1F̃ (50)
Since γn ≥ 0, according to Ten Raa (2006, p. 22, Theorem 2.2) (multiply the column vector
by Γ), F always has a unique solution.
36
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
From Proposition 2, when µ > λn, at equilibrium we have






































































n is increasing in λn and the best choice to reduce informality






nk/xn, the derivative is negative and the
tax administration should focus on cross checking as much as possible (λn = 1). However,
according to Proposition 2, if λn increases such that λn > µ, the informal firm start matching
with their peers to eliminate the cross-checking risk from their detection probability. The
turning point that makes an informal firm indifferent between matching and not matching





nk/xn – and its best choice is λn = µ. In sum, the optimal cross-checking in















Finally, using (44), we obtain (26).
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
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− 1 = 0 (60)
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and Λ is defined as (9).
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A.5 Market demand constraint and assortative matching equilib-
rium
In the main model, I assumed that the informal firms are not constrained by market demand
and their optimal decisions are always found by the internal optimum of their profit maximiza-
tion problem. In this part, I want to analyze their behavior when market demand is binding
and imposes a corner solution to their decision. As mentioned above, an informal firm can
choose between two actions to deal with cross-checking: (I) selling to all types of clients, (II)
commit and match with an informal client. In each case, I denote the internal solution of the
optimal production of an informal firm (as the case of Proposition 1) by xi∗n and the maximum
purchase of available customers for a representative informal firm by x̂in. In a similar way, I










n, the market demand is binding and producing
at the level of yi∗n is not possible for informal firms. In order to take market demand into
consideration, I assume that final consumers are indifferent between buying from formal and
informal markets such that the share of informal sales in final consumption of industry n is
yin
yn
wβn, where wβn is the value of final consumption in industry n (see (8)).
28 Then, we can
find the production level and payoff of an informal firm from choosing each action. Given the
concavity of the profit, the actual production value of the informal firm after each action will








n after choosing action (I) and (II).
Table 4: Outcomes of an informal firm from action (I) (selling to all types of firms) and action
(II) (not selling to formal firms) – yi∗n represents the internal solution of optimization problem,















































Moving from (I) to (II), the value of market demand ŷin drops, but when cross-checking
is optimal and λn > 0 the endogenous optimum y
i∗
n increases. The market available after
action (I) is the total demand in the industry and it is the optimal choice of informal firms
when λn = 0. On the other hand, when cross-checking is optimal and action (I) has lower y
i∗
n ,
informal suppliers, missing the formal market demand, match with their informal clients.
28alternatively, one can assume a fixed share of final consumers for each type of firms, but as long as the
inter-firm factors does not affect the final demand of each group the qualitative results are the same.
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According to Table 4, the equilibrium point may change based on whether ŷin is binding or
not. When there is no restriction from market demand, the results are presented in Proposition
4 and 3. In comparison, when the market demand is binding, FOC of profit maximization
in proposition 1 and 2 are not valid anymore and informal production in each industry is
determined by the production of the clients. There are two equilibriums in which the market
demand ŷn is binding. First, if y
i∗
n (I) > ŷ
i
n(I), informal firms choose (I) and supply all market
demand in industry n. In reality, this can happen when market demand for product n is so
small that the tax administration leaves it out from taxation (e.g. exemption policies). The
second case is when yi∗n (II) > ŷ
i
n(II) and the optimal λn is positive. This equilibrium is an
assortative matching equilibrium, in the sense that informal firms match with the same type
customers and supply all of the informal demand while, formal firms just sell in the formal
market to formal businesses or final consumers. This equilibrium is in close relation to the
results of De Paula and Scheinkman (2010) which show under VAT each firm trades with the
same type. The below Proposition presents the optimal policy when the equilibrium in some
industries are AM.
Proposition 5 If AM holds in industries indexed by M + 1, . . . , N , then the optimal policies
are






















where G21 is the vector containing g
2
1, . . . , g
2
M of the M industries that are not under AM,
subscripts 1 and 2 represent the decomposition of the corresponding vector or matrix into









D = (I − Y −12 B −A22)−1A21.
Proof 5 Online appendix.
Here, we have two groups of firms: 1 ≤ m ≤ M in which AM is not the equilibrium and
M < k ≤ N which are under AM. The results 1 indicates that in the industries that are
40
under AM, the administration should focus only on invoice cross-checking. In this case, the
level of expenditures are such that πi∗k (I) ≤ π̂ik(II).
On the other hand, according to the result 2, the optimal expenditures for industries
1≤m ≤M are similar to Proposition 4, but with some changes due to AM. Basically, AM
imposes a linear relationship between informality in industries M < k ≤ N and 1 ≤ m ≤ M
which is reflected in a transformation matrix D in the sense that X i2 = DX
i
1. This relationship
transforms X i2 into X
i
1 and reduces the dimension of optimization matrix from N to M .






12 and A1 + DA2 (both with M rows) respectively. Hence, if binding
constraints from demand side is added to the model, still the results of Proposition 4 and 3
are valid with the difference that here X i2 is indirectly affected by G1 through X
i
1 but not by
G2. The role of G2 is just to prevent firms from choosing action (I).
When AM is not the initial equilibrium, tax administration may be able to shift the
equilibrium to the point that AM holds. According to Proposition 5, AM can be imposed to







can make AM the desirable equilibrium for the administration. First, under AM, informal
firms constrained by the market demand, produce below their optimal level which leads to
less informality. Second, if formal firms comprise a large share of clients of industry n (large∑
k x
f
nk), the administration can spend much less in industry n to hold AM (small g
AM
n ). To




nk, the administration can increase enforcement in
the industries that buy product n as input. As an example, if industry m is the only customer
of industry n, the administration can impose AM in n by increasing gm and choosing λn = 1.
Then informality in both m and n decline with the possibility that gn under AM is less than
before. Thus, imposing AM in industry n can be optimal if the benefits (higher fn, fm and
possibly less gn) beats the cost (higher gm). For finding the industries that AM is the desirable
equilibrium, the administration needs to compare the overall benefits and costs with and
without imposing AM in each industry which can be very complicated to model analytically.
However, looking at the denominator of gAMn , we can say that the required expenditure to
impose AM in industries that have low forward linkages is large and if all client of an industry
are final consumers, gAMn approaches infinity and AM cannot be implemented. Therefore, AM
is more likely to be the optimal equilibrium in an industry with strong forward linkages and
large number of formal customers.
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Table A.1: Formality estimates for Indian states – Tax registration rate (TRR) is the percentage of
firm registered under tax. Formal share of production (FSP) measures the percentage of production by tax
registered firms. Both estimates are averaged across services activities as listed in Table A.2. The indices are
estimated by the author using representative NSSO surveys.
state TRR FSP state TRR FSP
Jammu and Kashmir 2.63 3.71 Assam 6.95 9.43
Himachal Pradesh 7.45 12.81 West Bengal 13.69 29.79
Punjab 2.97 9.46 Jharkhand 6.79 14.28
Chandigarh 8.97 14.75 Orissa 6.65 12.80
Uttarkhand 2.88 3.08 Chattisgarh 5.26 5.93
Haryana 5.12 10.88 Madhya Pradesh 10.00 16.73
Delhi 12.50 20.60 Gujarat 10.22 28.55
Rajasthan 7.59 10.82 Daman and Diu 1.25 1.28
Uttar Pradesh 8.75 15.13 Dadra and Nagar Haveli 2.08 1.93
Bihar 1.99 6.61 Maharashtra 15.89 39.99
Sikkim 3.07 3.06 Andhra Pradesh 12.78 21.22
Arunachal Pradesh 20.47 20.98 Karnataka 10.63 18.59
Nagaland 20.98 22.80 Goa 6.36 6.37
Manipur 13.11 19.59 Kerala 7.35 18.56
Mizoram 13.15 11.27 Tamil Nadu 5.39 10.79
Tripura 6.71 7.91 Puducherry 5.51 10.32
Meghalaya 19.86 23.99 Andaman and Nicobar Islands 3.68 5.06
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Table A.2: Summary statistics at industry level – Tax registration rate (TRR) is the percentage of
firm registered under tax. Formal share of production (FSP) measures the percentage of production by tax
registered firms. The sample includes the activities included in services tax rule between 2001 and 2006, and
is chosen based on various notifications of service tax rule, Government of India (for details see each service
profile at http://www.servicetax.gov.in). Services under financial intermediation and trade categories are
not sampled in the round 57 of NSS survey and are not listed here. The correlation between forward and
backward linkages is 0.26.
NIC Activity TRR FPS FL BL
55204 Outdoor Caterer 0.65 4.17 1.39 2.23
60231 Transport of goods by Road 11.73 22.36 1.84 2.22
61100 Port Service: Water transport, inland 45.41 47.45 1.82 1.82
61200 Port Service : Water transport, sea and coastal 1.01 1.29 1.82 1.82
63011 Cargo Handling: Land Transport 24.79 27.30 1.98 1.95
63012 Cargo Handling: Water Transport 84.89 99.98 1.98 1.95
63013 Cargo Handling: Air Transport 91.67 96.39 1.98 1.95
63021 Storage & Warehousing: Agriculture 13.48 23.89 2.78 2.55
63022 Storage & Warehousing: Cold Storage 39.55 54.26 2.78 2.55
63023 Storage & Warehousing: Non-agriculture 11.23 23.55 2.78 2.55
64110 Mailing List Compilation and Mailing 22.22 14.47 2.49 1.53
64202 Internet Telecommunication Service; Broadcasting 12.16 15.76 2.49 1.53
64203 Telecommunication Service: Maintenance 1.20 1.72 2.49 1.53
64204 Cable Operator 14.82 26.93 2.49 1.53
72294 On-line Information: Web-page designing 10.17 25.44 1.20 1.52
72295 Maintenance or Repair: Software 38.10 48.26 1.20 1.52
72400 On-line Information: Database Access or Retrieval Service 11.78 26.35 1.20 1.52
72501 Maintenance or Repair: Computer Hardware 14.25 31.10 1.20 1.52
72502 Maintenance or Repair: Accounting Machinery 12.50 11.26 1.20 1.52
72901 Internet Cafe 15.05 17.85 1.20 1.52
72909 Maintenance or Repair: Other Computer Based Systems 8.35 16.33 1.20 1.52
74130 Business Auxiliary; Opinion Poll; Intellectual Property Service 16.67 18.03 2.57 2.07
74140 Scientific or Technical Consultancy 13.86 29.05 2.57 2.07
74930 Cleaning Service 26.41 36.62 2.57 2.07
74940 Photography 3.96 10.84 2.57 2.07
74950 Packaging Service 5.05 6.98 2.57 2.07
74992 Business supporting activities 5.71 15.20 2.57 2.07
74994 Fashion Designer 0.96 2.09 2.57 2.07
74999 Business Exhibition; Pandal or Shamiana Service 4.81 14.52 2.57 2.07
80902 Training or Coaching: Coaching Centres 5.05 13.91 1.01 1.20
80903 Training or Coaching: by individuals 2.20 6.09 1.01 1.20
80904 Training or Coaching: Computer Courses 3.86 13.13 1.01 1.20
91990 Clubs and Associations 5.84 23.52 1.83 1.66
92111 Video Tape Production: Motion Pictures 39.05 58.15 1.59 1.48
92113 Video Tape Production: Video 5.27 5.65 1.59 1.48
92115 Sound Recording 0.40 8.27 1.59 1.48
92132 T.V. & radio Programme Production Services 11.30 20.99 1.59 1.48
92411 Fitness Centre 3.63 12.01 1.59 1.48
92412 Health Club 1.14 0.75 1.59 1.48
92413 Event Management: Sport 4.60 8.00 1.59 1.48
92490 Convention Centre 4.81 6.98 1.59 1.48
93010 Dry Cleaning 2.62 3.69 1.83 1.66
93030 Event Management: Funeral 2.19 4.56 1.83 1.66
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Proof of Proposition 5
If λn = 0, informal firms are always better off by choosing (I) and AM is not the equilibrium.
Thus if AM is the equilibrium λn > 0. Moreover, as shown in Proposition 3, because the profits
are monotone in λn, its optimal level is either zero or one. Under AM, the administration
does not need to make the firm indifferent between yi∗n (I) and y
i∗
n (II) (since y
i∗
n (II) ≥ ȳin(II)),
thus λn is not constrained by the corresponding search cost µ and at optimum λn = 1.
On the other hand, holding AM requires πi∗n (I) ≤ π̄in(II) ≤ πi∗n (II). This indicates that
for imposing AM in industry n, the administration has to set the efforts such that the infor-
mal firms are indifferent between actions (I) and (II) while the market demand is binding.
When λn = 1, we always have π
i∗
n (I) ≤ πi∗n (II), and under AM the demand constraint yields
π̄in(II) ≤ πi∗n (II), thus AM will be the equilibrium if gn is chosen such that πi∗n (I) ≤ π̄in(II). By
substituting (38) and (39) in (32), we obtain the profit after action (I) as






where τn = t(1−θηn). With a first order approximation similar to Proposition 1, (64) becomes








nk/xn – see (18). This means that τn is independent of y
i
n
and if 1+ τn > 0, the optimal production tends to infinity. Therefore, the level of enforcement
expenditure gn that holds π
i∗









In the next step, I want to derive the optimal policy when AM is the equilibrium in some
industries. Without loss of generality, I divide the industries into two groups: Industries
1, . . . ,M that the AM is not the equilibrium, and M+1, . . . , N in which AM is held. If AM












(67) gives no answer for the industries that possess no forward linkages (
∑
k αnkyk = 0 and
yn = wβn) since they do not have any business customers. Therefore, the industries with
no forward linkage are indexed among 1, . . . ,M . The informal firms that work in industries
1, . . . ,M get the same payoff as before, and the optimal cross-checking for them can be
obtained from Proposition 3. Now, if I decompose vector Y into Y1 and Y2 consisting of
1





, we can write (67) as









where Y 2 is a diagonal metrics consisting of yM+1, . . . , yN respectively. From (68) we can find
Y i2 = (I − Y −12 B2 −A22)−1A21Y i1 , (69)
so by knowing Y i1 , Y
i
2 is obtained from (69). Now, we can use this results to find the optimal






n − gn (70)
which can be rewritten in matrix form as
r = tA′Y f − I ′G (71)
where G is a vector of gns. From (69), define D = (I − Y −12 B −A22)−1A21, then
Y f2 = Y2 − Y i2 = Y2 −DY1 + DY
f
1 (72)
Then, we can decompose r for the two groups of industries as






2(Y2 −DY1)− I ′G (73)
Define Λ and Y as diagonal matrices containing pn
1−λn and yn as elements respectively, then
we have Y f = Y F and similar to (50) we can find










where G−11 is a M × 1 vector comprising 1/g1, . . . , 1/gM . Using (72), it turns out
Y f1 =
(







1 + A12Γ2(Y2 −DY1)
)
(75)
Substituting (75) in (73) yields
r = r0 −
tḡx̄
2θ
HG−1 − I ′G (76)







I − A11Γ1 − A12Γ2D
)−1
Λ1 (77)
Thus, if hm is the m
th element of H



















Which yields to (63).
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Time-line of taxation reforms in India
Tax reforms in India initialized in 1985 during Rajiv Gandhis government and enormous
progress has been made since 1991 liberalization. In below, the timeline of main reforms is
listed.
Reforms in direct taxes
1. Personal income tax:
• 1973: 11 brackets, rate range 10 to 85%
• 1985: 4 brackets, less than 50%
• 1992: 3 brackets, 20,30, 40%
• 1997: 3 brackets, 10, 20, 30%
2. Corporate income tax:
• Before 1990s: taxing the profits of companies and dividends of shareholders between
45-60%
• In 1993, rate was unified at 40%
• In 1996, MAT (minimum alternative tax) pay 30% on book profit
• In 1997, 35% and 10% on dividend shifted from individuals to companies
• In 2000, dividend tax increased to 20%, then reduced to 10% in 2001 and levied
on shareholders
• In 2003, again levied from companies
• Major corporate tax preferences investment and depreciation allowance
• Securities transactions in 2004 and tax of 0.1% on all cash withdrawal above 25000
from current account in 2005
• In 2005, CIT of domestic firms reduced to 30%
3. Wealth tax: 1973: 5%, 1985: 2.5%, 1992: 1% and financial assets excluded
4. From 2004, 2% surcharge in all tax for education
Reforms in indirect tax
1. Central excise duties, moving toward VAT:
• after independence mostly raw materials and intermediate goods,
• 1975: extended to all manufacturing products, but with a complex and distor-
tionary structure,
• 1986: MODVAT was implemented (not covering capital goods),
• 1993: converted to ad valorem rate except few commodities like tea, cement, cig-
gerate,
• 1994: extended to capital goods and petroleum products,
• 1996: MODVAT covered a majority of commodities,
3
• 1999: 11 rates merged to 3 rates,
• 2000: 3 rates merged to 16% and called Central VAT,
• 2003: again 3 rates structure (8, 16, 24%).
2. Custom duties:
• Prior to 1990s: tariff rates were high and complex;
• weighted average rate: 38% in 1980, 87 in 1989;
• Peak rates: 400% in 1990, 1991: 150%, 1992:110%, 1993:85%,, 2007:10%;
• Number of major rates was reduced from 22 in 1990 to 4 in 2003.
3. Service taxes:
• entertainment, passengers and goods are assigned to states;
• In 1994, government levied tax on insurance, stock brokerages, and telecommuni-
cation;
• In 2003 rate increased from 5 to 8% and the list expanded;
• In 2004 rate was 10% and the list included 80 services.
4. States sales tax:
• Before introduction of VAT, there was no harmony in the rates among the states;
• A uniform categorical floor rate of sales tax is implemented with effect from 2000;
• Introduction of VAT in 21 states in 2005 (Haryana in 2003). 8 states assigned later;
• Urban local bodies impose a tax on the entry of goods (octroi);
• In designing VAT, attempts made to harmonize it among the state, keeping also a
little flexibility;
• The general rates:
– 0% or exempted: Agricultural product and basic necessities,
– 1%: precious metals,
– 4% (5% after 2009): common consumption goods,
– 12.5%: the rest,
– 20% and above: Special items like Fuel and petrol.
5. Next step in indirect tax reform is ongoing: Goods and Services Tax (GST) - proposed
to be introduced by April 2016.
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